Are Israel and Russia on the Same Page?

With reports today that Russia will ship its advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missile defense system to Syria, that and follow-up reports that Israel has threatened to attack Russia's missile shipments to Syria, suddenly Israel's relationship with Russia has come into sharp focus on the international stage. All of which is compounded by leading members of the European Union agreeing to lift their embargo on weapons shipments to the Syrian opposition/rebels. As a result, key questions must be asked:

• What is Russia's long-term objective in propping up the Assad regime, aside from maintaining its naval port at Tartus?
• How would Russia react if Israel indeed attacked shipments of Russian S-300 missiles?
• Is the West incrementally inching toward armed intervention in Syria?
• If Syrian President Assad were assassinated or incapacitated, what role might Iran and Hezbollah play in shaping the regime that replaces or displaces Assad?

Events are rapidly escalating the Syrian crisis. The number of innocent killed is over 80,000, with no end in sight. The major powers are apparently set to significantly increase their armaments to both sides of the civil war. Is this a powder keg about to explode? Sure looks like it. - R.O.

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Are Israel and Russia on the Same Page?

by Zalman Shoval

Though the U.S. and Russia have agreed to hold a summit in Geneva to try to diplomatically resolve the conflict in Syria and establish an interim Syrian government, it is highly doubtful that Russia and the U.S. are of one mind as to what the diplomatic resolution should be. Israel, as we all know, does not have a clear preference as to which side winds up on top: It is not indifferent to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's atrocities, but it is also aware that the rebels, or at least some of them, may pose no less of a threat.

The Russians have a direct interest in the events in Syria, and the lightning meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earlier this month is proof of that. We don't know exactly what was said behind closed doors in Sochi, but we cannot assume that Putin initiated the meeting (and he did in fact initiate it) just to inform Netanyahu that Russia would not cancel its missile deal with the Syrians due to supposed contractual obligations or commercial reputation considerations. A regime change in Syria would jeopardize the strategic, diplomatic and economic interests of Putin's Russia, much like the interests of the Soviet Union before it.

The S-300 anti-aircraft missile system. (BBC)

The Syrian port of Tartus is the home base of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. Since Moscow wants to preserve its status (at least in its own view) as a regional superpower in the Middle East, it must carefully consider its conduct on the day after Assad's fall -- and Israel apparently plays into Russia's considerations.

It is possible that the Russians will try to forge ties with whomever rises to power in Damascus after Assad, but they are also considering the possibility that Syria will splinter and a small Alawite state will be established in the northeaster part of the country -- where the port of Tartus is situated. The Americans, unlike the Russians, are still hoping for a unified Syria with a democratic leadership that would cooperate with the West, though they are less confident in the likelihood of this actually happening.

In the past, Soviet policy in the Middle East rested mainly on support for the Arabs, including Arab terror organizations, and hostility toward Israel -- both because Stalin viewed Zionism as the most dangerous enemy of communism and because of Israel's relationship with the U.S. in the context of the Cold War. In this regard, things have changed, and thankfully so.

Currently, Russia isn't entirely in love with Assad either. Russia's support for Assad is a default policy. But much like Israel, Russia is worried that if Assad falls, a fundamentalist-Islamist hub will arise in his place. In this regard, Jerusalem and Moscow share a common future interest (even if it is for different reasons). In the meantime, Israel expects Russia to convince Assad that it has no intention of attacking him as long as he prevents the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah. Israel also wants Russia to make it clear to Assad that if he should violate this expectation, or provoke Israel other ways, there will be a response.

There is currently more than one game being played at the Syrian card table. One player is playing poker while another player is playing bridge. The players and partners are also inconsistent. At this point, it is not yet clear which player is holding the winning card, or even if such a card exists. In any case, Israel has to play its cards close to the chest and refrain from unnecessary chatter. And of course Israel must not forget that specific or temporary interests, as important as they may be, are no substitute for the long-term relationship with the U.S.

Russia's Brinkmanship with US Clashes with Israel's Security

A brief summary of Russia's recent foreign policy moves and how they impact Israel. Does Russia think there won't be consequences for supporting terror states like Iran and Syria? -R.O.

Middle East and Terrorism: Russia's Brinkmanship with US Clashes with Israel's Security

by Yaakov Lappin

"Jerusalem will find Russia's delivery of the S-300 missile system to Syria to be an intolerable development; it is safe to assume that Israel will act to prevent this from happening."

Russia is aggressively squaring off with an indecisive and rather meek West about Syria, and in the process, is also threatening to undermine Israeli efforts to ensure that Iran and Syria do not ship strategic weapons to Hezbollah.

The Syrian civil war has become a dangerous and complex battle of multiple actors and their proxies: Sunni versus Shi'ite, Iran versus the Gulf states, Al-Qaeda versus Hezbollah, and on a global scale, the United States versus Russia.

Moscow is trying to deter a potential US or NATO-led initiative to set up a no-fly zone over areas of Syria, and is seeking to stop Western-led air strikes against chemical weapons sites.
Russia also seems concerned that recent air strikes in Damascus targeting Hezbollah-bound guided Iranian missiles -- strikes attributed by the foreign media to Israel -- will pave the way to such an intervention.

Israel has no interest in getting involved in the Syrian civil war. Rather, it is looking out for the safety of millions of citizens, who already live in the shadow of some 80,000 Hezbollah rockets, and would be threatened further by the transfer of precise, powerful missiles to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In recent days, Russia unleashed a flurry of moves to establish its support of Syria.

The Russian moves include: Declaring that it will proceed with deliveries of the advanced S-300 air defense system to Assad, mobilizing war ships to the eastern Mediterranean, and selling sophisticated surface-to-sea Yakhont missiles to Assad.

Moscow's recent maneuvers might be more bluster than real -- the S-300 has yet to be delivered, and Russia was in 2010 talked out of selling the formidable air defense system to Iran.

The threat, however, was serious enough for Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to make an unscheduled trip last week to Russia to meet with President Vladimir Putin. The two later held a press conference, repeating their public positions, but it is doubtful that those statements were a complete reflection of their private exchange.

Israel is opposed to Assad receiving the S-300 missile for several reasons: With its sophisticated radars and range of 200 kilometers, the S-300 can hamper Israel Air Force aircraft seeking to monitor Hezbollah in Lebanon. The system can also disrupt future Israeli efforts to intercept the transit of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah through Syria. Finally, Assad can choose to smuggle S-300 batteries to Hezbollah or Iran.

Should the S-300 fall into Iranian hands, the future potential mission of launching a military strike on Iran's developing nuclear program would be more even more complex than it already is. Knowing that the S-300 was in Hezbollah's hands, and could target Israeli aircraft sent to stop it, would only boost the Shi'ite terror organization's confidence to launch cross-border attacks on Israel. For these reasons, Jerusalem will find Russia's delivery of such a system to Syria to be an intolerable development; it is safe to assume that Israel will act to prevent this from happening.

Similarly, the Russian Yakhont missiles already delivered to Syria threaten Israel Navy ships carrying out vital missions in the Mediterranean.

Behind closed-doors, intense diplomacy -- including the sudden visit by CIA Director John Brennan to Israel -- is underway to try and contain these developments, and prevent them from triggering further regional security deterioration.

Yaakov Lappin

Source: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3722/russia-syria-israel

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Israel caught in the middle as U.S. and Russia clash over Syria’s future

Excellent analysis on the complex dynamics at play in the Middle East. This period in world history is certainly not for the faint of heart. Looks like we're in for some fireworks. -R.O.

Israel caught in the middle as U.S. and Russia clash over Syria’s future - Haaretz

The conflict of interests between the U.S. and Russia over Syria is closely linked to an issue that has recently slipped down the priority ranks but is expected to take center stage again soon – the Iranian nuclear program.

By Amos Harel | May.18, 2013 | 10:55 PM

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, left, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow. Photo by Reuters

The recent developments in Syria have been overshadowed by the direct clash of interests between the United States and Russia, in which Israel plays a minor, if inadvertent, role.

While Washington continues to hesitate over the degree of force needed to affect regime change in Damascus, Moscow, which does not believe that toppling Syrian President Bashar Assad will necessarily benefit the Syrian people, continues to warn against its possible replacement by a Sunni extremist government.

On the strategic level, even after the publication of images of the latest atrocities in Syria and the new accusations of use of chemical weapons, Russia has two goals: To keep the regime in place for as long as possible, since it maintains its hold on Tartus as Moscow’s private port in the Mediterranean Sea, and to subvert U.S. influence in the region.

At the same time that it prepares to host an international conference on Syria in June, Russia finds it comfortable to also flex its muscles over the three aerial strikes in Syrian territory that have been attributed in the foreign media to Israel. That is the reason for the current talk of deliveries, not yet completed as far as is known, of Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Syria. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s failure to persuade the Russians to halt the deal signaled the start of a new war of leaks between Washington and Moscow. Every day a different U.S. news outlet receives information about the worrying scope of Russian assistance to Assad’s regime. Of particular concern to Israel, in addition to the S-300 surface-to-air missiles, are an advanced version of the high-precision Yakhont shore-to-ship missiles and the punched-up presence of Russian warships in the waters surrounding Tartus.

There is probably little Israel can do to scotch the Russian-Syrian arms deal. Even assuming that Iran will keep prodding Assad to help it in getting armaments to Hezbollah, Israel may have already used up most of its ammunition. The temptation to intervene militarily to halt munitions smuggling is always great: Intelligence officials will say they have precise information and cannot promise the same quality of intelligence after the advanced weapons systems have crossed the border into Lebanon. The pressure on the leadership to approve additional operations targeting arms shipments will be significant.

On the other hand, there’s no guarantee that the paralysis that gripped Assad after the previous strikes will continue forever. A senior Israeli official responded in The New York Times on Wednesday to Syrian and Hezbollah threats to take action against Israel after the third strike, in late April, with a direct threat to take down the Assad regime. But that is not what Israel wants. Among the myriad dispiriting options in Syria it is the current situation, however unappealing, that is presumably the least terrible.

On Saturday, The Times of London reported a senior Israeli intelligence official as saying that Assad was preferable to the rebels. Former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy, writing in Foreign Affairs earlier this month, even went so far as to call Assad “Israel’s man in Damascus.”

Iran: The next chapter

The complex political battle surrounding Syria is closely linked to another issue, one that seems to have slipped down the priority ranks slightly in the past few months, namely Iran’s nuclear program. It’s been some months since Israel has explicitly threatened to attack Iran. The lull is partly due to the wintry weather, thought to further complicate aerial strikes on that country. It might also be linked to understandings reached between Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama during the latter’s March visit to Israel.

But that doesn’t mean the Iran chapter is behind us. It’s only a delay, until next month’s presidential election in Iran. America told Israel: Let’s wait for the election. If the ayatollahs’ regime tries to skew the results, as in 2009, perhaps another “green revolution” will break out in Iran, and perhaps this time it will, with inspiration from the Arab Spring, be more effective.

And even if the Iranian regime does survive, as is likely, the political and economic pressure on the country might finally convince the country’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to at least consider temporarily suspending the nuclear program in exchange for an easing of the international sanctions. If nothing happens, Washington has hinted, perhaps we will need to take direct action against Iran on our own.

Israel does not entirely trust this veiled promise from the United States, mainly in light of the White House’s embarrassing hesitancy over Syria and limp response to North Korea’s nuclear muscle-flexing. The Obama administration has been caught up in a series of public-relation disasters since the start of the president’s second term. All of this must suggest to Netanyahu that once again he has been left to fix the Iranian nuclear problem alone.

The prime minister will certainly not take comfort in a new report released on Friday by the Rand Corporation, that dares to ask the question that must not be raised in polite society: What will the region look like after Iran achieves nuclear capabilities? The veteran U.S. think tank, which often works for the government, says that obtaining nuclear weapons will further Iran’s national security goals, deter Israel and the United States from an attack in Iran, lead to greater instability in the region and increase the likelihood of war, whether by accident or as the result of a series of misunderstandings between Tehran and Jerusalem.

All of the obstacles that stood in the way of an Israeli attack on Iran last year will be relevant this year as well: The Obama administration is opposed to unilateral action from Israel, technocrats in Israel are against it, and there is a new, political obstacle in the form of Netanyahu’s main coalition partner in the new government, Finance Minister Yair Lapid. Lapid’s civil and economic agenda has no room for war with Iran. Nevertheless, it’s a safe bet that within a month, after the dust of the Iranian election settles, the issue of the ayatollahs’ nukes will once again claim center stage.