Why Foreign Fighters are Joining ISIL (Part 2)

Part 2 of my three-part series on "Why Foreign Fighters are Joining ISIL" was published yesterday by The Huffington Post. Check out Part 1 here and read Part 2 below. - R.O.
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Why Foreign Fighters are Joining ISIL

The Huffington Post

By: Robert D. Onley - October 13, 2014

Part 2 of 3 in a series. Read Part 1.

A Global Caliphate for Islam's messiah
Whether ISIL fighters are "brain-washed" or self-inculcated via the internet, the ISIL brand of radical Islam is turning men into remorseless killers. Western, African or Arab, these men are being deluded by End Times visions of reviving the Islamic Caliphate from which they believe that the Islamic messiah, the Mahdi, or "Guided One", will one day rule and eventually conquer the world.

To that end, as a sophisticated, modern jihadist enterprise, ISIL has released its 3rd issue of Dabiq digital magazine. Its title, "A Call to Hijrah", likens Muhammad's "emigration" from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD, which first established Islam as a militant state. As described in the Qur'an, it was in Mecca that Muhammad's message was shared as one of peace. However, in Medina, his message called for the violent overthrow of all non-Muslims. It is clear that ISIL is adhering to the call for the latter.

ISIL is further cognizant of Islamic prophecies found predominantly in the hadiths, which state that the Mahdi will return after a time of great turmoil and suffering upon the earth, and will establish justice and righteousness throughout the world by eradicating tyranny and oppression. The hadiths add that the Mahdi will lead a world revolution and establish a 'new world order' through military action against all those who oppose him. The fact that the hadiths also say that the Mahdi will rule the world from Jerusalem helps elucidate the perpetual fixation on conquering Israel which is espoused by nearly all global jihadist movements.

Comparatively, the prophetic emergence of the Mahdi would be to the majority of Muslims what the return of Jesus would be to Christians. These prophecies also state the Mahdi is the awaited final Caliph of the religion of Islam as a whole, and thus, of the "Islamic State". To date, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi has not referred to himself as the Mahdi, perhaps understanding that many Islamic prophecies have yet to be fulfilled and moreover that discerning Islamists are carefully watching ISIL's actions before potentially joining the movement.

Nonetheless, it is the very prospect of an emergent future leader with the theological and prophetic capacity to unite Sunni and Shi'a forces which may serve to most prominently "fulfill" Islamic prophecies concerning the End Times.

Can the "Islamic State" unite Sunni and Shi'a Islam?
Much like Biblical scholarship on the prophesied end of humanity, interpretative views on Islamic "End Times" differ sharply between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims.

As a Sunni Islamic movement, ISIL is committed to the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate with Jerusalem as the capital of the new global "Islamic Empire". Author Daniel Pipes, a recognized scholar on Islam and Islamic radicalism, has stated that while he does not expect ISIL to survive, it will "leave a legacy", adding:

No matter how calamitous the fate of Caliph Ibrahim [Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi] and his grim crew, they have successfully resurrected a central institution of Islam, making the caliphate again a vibrant reality. Islamists around the world will treasure its moment of brutal glory and be inspired by it.

It appears that Sunni Islamist militants are more than inspired; the total acceptance of these Islamic End Times views is geographically diverse and pervasive within radical Islamist groups. Islam's broader end of days themes have also been adopted by Israel's arch foes Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah (albeit a Shi'a Islamic interpretation of the End Times), along with Boko Haram in Nigeria (which has also declared an "Islamic State"), al-Shabaab in Somalia, and the terrorist stalwart al-Qaeda.

While opposed to ISIL and joining the fight against the group, the Ayatollah of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Shi'a Muslim theocracy has also publicly stated that the return of Shi'a Islam's 'Hidden' Imam, or Mahdi, is imminent, and that the Mahdiwill kill all infidels. Such proclamations add contrast to ISIL's apocalyptic narrative, and also frame the Sunni-Shi'a prophetic divide as one which contains common and intriguing threads.

Beyond prophecy, on a tactical military level, ISIL's success is also attracting potential alliances from other terrorist organizations, such as with the Taliban's ally Hezb-e-Islami. Under unified leadership, whether from the current Caliph, or perhaps one day from another leader from Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Turkey, ISIL could theoretically bridge internal Sunni divides while co-opting disparate jihadist and resistance factions under a common banner.

Unified leadership could also quiet the vocal opposition to ISIL which has percolated up from within numerous Islamist factions who believe that Al-Baghdadi is an illegitimate 'Caliph'. But as Caliph Ibrahim's ISIL army continues to march in the face of air strikes, such speculation is within the realm of possibility down the road.

ISIL's Longevity
The bigger picture of Islamic eschatology and prophecy includes the return of Isa (Jesus), the rise of the Dajjal (Islam's anti-Christ), and the reign of the Mahdi (Messiah), all of which will usher in Allah's 'Day of Judgment'. Thus, if ISIL maintains even partial military success and territorial control for the foreseeable future, the allure of ISIL's End Times ideology will only become more intoxicating for foreign fighters and ISIL adherents around the world. Moreover, despite a UN Security Council Resolution, it is improbable to think that Western legislative measures will definitively halt the growing number of foreign ISIL recruits in the immediate term. This poses a serious threat to regional and global stability.

Add into this mix the possibility that the US and its "core coalition" could fail to conclusively stop ISIL in Syria and Iraq through military action. What exactly is the West's plan if ISIL manages to maintain its territorial grip, first for a year, and then a second year? Why have President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry been quick to assess that this battle will not require "boots on the ground"? (Pay no attention to the boots of military "advisors" already on the ground.)

If ISIL manages to maintain the semblance of a mini Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the complete picture of the Islamic End Times (set out above) would come into view for ISIL fighters and would-be ISIL members across the world. These fighters might perceive the continued expansion and existence of ISIL as the actual fulfillment of The Promise of Allah.

Policy planners must imagine and plan for the current or future ISIL Caliph calling for a Second Arab Spring of uprisings to overthrow the remaining dictators across the Middle East. Alternatively, the Caliph could call for these sitting leaders to form a military alliance with ISIL to wage war against Israel, or else face civil unrest stoked by ISIL provocateurs.

These possibilities may sound like a distant Islamist fantasy, but as the Western world struggles to agree on how to confront ISIL, let alone "defeat" it, the ISIL movement continues to grow more legitimate and capable of recruiting more supporters. Does comfortable Western civilization have the stomach to confront such a barbaric enemy?

Part 3 will be published soon.

Time to Define Islamism as a Crime Against Humanity

"Time to Define Islamism as a Crime Against Humanity" - Jerusalem Post
By: Seth J. Frantzman
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Terra-Incognita-Its-time-to-define-Islamism-as-a-crime-against-humanity-326888

The attacks at Nairobi, Kenya’s Westgate shopping mall follow a familiar pattern to other attacks that occurred in the last few days: in Pakistan, where 81 were killed in the bombing of a church, and in Nigeria where 159 people were slaughtered by Islamists near Maiduguri.

The media and political reactions also follow a neatly crafted script we have all become accustomed to.

First Islamist terrorists attack civilians, attempting to sort out the Muslims from the non-Muslims so as to kill only one group. There are the condemnations of “senseless acts of violence” and appeals for “calm and unity.” Then all is forgotten.Those terrorists captured alive will be put on trial and perhaps executed. And life goes back to normal with the refrain, “terrorism will not prevail.”

The problem is that this script misses a central facet of Islamist terrorism: We must stop treating it as a simple isolated crime; even the word “terrorism” has begun to downplay its actual horror; rather it must be defined as a worldwide crime against humanity.

When the al-Shabaab attack began in Kenya, witnesses related that Muslims were permitted to leave. “They came and said: ‘If you are Muslim, stand up. We’ve come to rescue you,’” Elijah Lamau told the BBC.The Muslims put their hands up and walked past the gunmen. “One man with a Christian first name but a Muslim-sounding surname managed to escape the attackers by putting his thumb over his first name on his ID.

However an Indian man standing next to him who was asked for the name of the Prophet Muhammad’s mother was shot dead when he was unable to answer.”Similarly, in 2004, 17 al-Qaida terrorists attacked the Oasis compound housing oilcompany employees in Khobar, Saudi Arabia.Upon entering the compound, the terrorists waylaid the first Arab looking man they saw and said: “Are you Muslim or Christian? We don’t want to kill Muslims.Show us where the Americans and Westerners live.”

The killers then came upon a US citizen from Iraq named Abu Hashem. He later told reporters that the attackers were polite; “They gave me a lecture on Islam and said they were defending their country and ridding it of infidels.” “Don’t be afraid,” they told him, “we won’t kill Muslims, even if you are an American.”The murderers then proceeded to hunt down non-Muslims from the US, South Africa, Sri Lanka, India, the Philippines, Egypt and Sweden.

After a 24-hour siege, 22 of the residents were murdered and many others wounded. In another instance, on November 27, 2008, in the midst of the Mumbai terror attacks, the perpetrators received a call from their Pakistan-based masters, asking, “How many hostages do you have?” The terrorist responded that they had killed a Belgian hostage but had others.“I hope there is no Muslim among them.”“No, none,” replied the killer.

Later the Pakistani handlers called the terrorists at the Oberoi Trident Hotel and spoke to those located on the 10th floor. The intercepted conversation goes as follows: “Kill all the hostages, except the two Muslims, keep your phone switched on so we can hear the gunfire.”They reply, “We have three foreigners, including women from Singapore and China.”Then the terrorist can be heard telling the hostages to line up, asking the two Muslims to stand to one side. Gunfire reverberates, followed by cheering from the terrorists.

It is interesting how quickly reports of these attacks downplay the guilt of the attackers and filter references to the focus on non-Muslims and the allowing some Muslims to escape the carnage. In November 2009 Fareed Zakaria at CNN did a special on the Mumbai transcripts. Zakaria claims the men were sent from Pakistan with “instructions simply to kill.”

After playing one clip in which any reference to letting Muslims live is absent, he notes that “they were told to go to Mumbai and kill as many people as they could.” Actually they were told to go to Mumbai to kill non-Muslims.

Zakaria emphasizes that the terrorists were poverty-stricken children. “These are peasant boys,” he says. To his credit, he does play a transcript from the terrorist attack at Nariman house, where the Chabad center was targeted. The CNN host mentions the “animus against Jews” but then claims, “in the ’60s and ’70s most Indian Muslims would not even know where Palestine was.” He compares the actions of the terrorists to “brainwashing... it’s sort of the Manchurian Candidate writ large.”

Later in the program the presenter again attempts to emphasize how young the terrorists were “these are peasant boys... these kids seem like teenagers... it [their action] seems almost mercenary.”Note how often Zakaria stresses that these were “boys” – he calls them “boys” twice, “kids” twice and “teenagers” once. The only terrorist captured alive, Ajmal Kasab, was 21 at the time of the attacks.The oldest attacker, Nasir Abu Umar, was 28, while the youngest was 20.

Why the conscious effort to redefine these men as children? Why the conscious decision not to include the part of the transcript including the instructions not to kill Muslims, and to paint the attack as indiscriminate? The real story was that these men set out to kill as many non-Muslims as possible.

The media seeks to hide this facet to foster the narrative of “unity,” yet presenting Muslims and non-Muslims as the victims of terror obscures the genocidal nature of the crime.

When the radical, right wing Golden Dawn party gained popularity last year, the media highlighted the “antiimmigrant violence” it was involved in.There was no downplaying the members as “peasant boys” or obscuring of who the violence was directed at.

These three examples – Mumbai, Khobar and Nairobi – are only the tip of the iceberg. From southern Thailand, to Mindanao in the Philippines, to Syria and beyond, the Islamist or jihadist mentality leads to the mass killing of either non- Muslims, or sometimes to the sectarian slaughter of Muslims, usually Shi’ites.Hundreds of Shi’ites are massacred every year in Pakistan by the Taliban, for instance.

In many cases the terrorists separate Shi’ites from non-Shi’ites, usually identifying them by their first names. For instance, on August 17, 2012, it was reported that “gunmen wearing army uniforms checked the identification cards of the passengers, lined up the Shi’ite passengers on the roadside, tied their hands and then opened fire on them.”

Sound familiar? Many over the years have identified Islamism as “Islamo-fascism” and argued that it champions a form of genocide. But it has not sunk in. We don’t prosecute terrorists as war criminals committing crimes against humanity. Instead, we often obfuscate the nature of terrorist attacks, pretending that terrorists are “misguided youth” who “set out to kill as many as possible.”

The genocidal nature of this type of terror is downplayed. The New York Times described the Nairobi perpetrators as “Shabaab militant attackers.” Really? When they killed 78-year-old Ghanian poet Kofi Awooner and Kenyan radio host Ruhila Adatia-Sood, was that part of a “military” operation? The scenes of piles of dead women sprawled on the floor of the mall; is that “militant?”

In a Times article on the anniversary of the Ku Klux Klan bombing of a church in 1963 the perpetrators are not called “militants.” Yet the objectives and methods of the KKK were no different than the Shabaab or Taliban: the killing of specific groups. No one pretends the KKK “set out to kill indiscriminately.”

The KKK is estimated to have killed 4,743 people between 1882 and 1968. The number of primarily sectariantargeted killings in Iraq in 2012 was 4,574.That’s just Iraq.Adding up the number of victims from attacks patterned along the lines of the one carried out in Kenya, or the ethnic cleansing of non-Muslims in places such as Egypt and Northern Nigeria, would bring the number up to tens of thousands in the past decade – millions in the past century.

This is a “soft” genocide, embodied by the firebombing of a church in Egypt or the shooting of Alawite truck drivers in Syria.It is time to stop hiding what connects Mumbai to Westgate and Khobar. It is a worldwide campaign of ethnic cleansing and murder, and the world community must define this as a crime against humanity and not just as “terrorism."

Iran's Plans to Take Over Syria

Iran’s Plans to Take Over Syria
By: Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira, May 2, 2013  Vol. 13, No. 10 5 May 2013

In mid-April, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah paid a secret visit to Tehran where he met with the top Iranian officials headed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Gen. Qasem Suleimani, who is in charge of Iranian policy in Lebanon and Syria. The visit was clandestine and no details were divulged on an official level – except for the exclusive posting on Hizbullah’s official website of a photograph of Khamenei with Nasrallah beside him in the former’s private library, with a picture of Ayatollah Khomeini above them.1

Suleimani’s involvement in the meeting with Nasrallah was significant. He has been the spearhead of Iranian military activism in the Middle East. In January 2012, he declared that the Islamic Republic controlled “one way or another” Iraq and South Lebanon.2 He now appeared to be prepared to extend Iran’s control to all of Syria.

A media source normally hostile to Iran and Hizbullah but which nonetheless contains accurate information, reported that Iran has formulated an operational plan for assisting Syria. The plan has been named for Gen. Suleimani. It includes three elements: 1) the establishment of a popular sectarian army made up of Shiites and Alawites, to be backed by forces from Iran, Iraq, Hizbullah, and symbolic contingents from the Persian Gulf. 2) This force will reach 150,000 fighters. 3) The plan will give preference to importing forces from Iran, Iraq, and, only afterwards, other Shiite elements. This regional force will be integrated with the Syrian army. Suleimani, himself, visited Syria in late February-early March to prepare the implementation of this plan.3

In the past, senior Iranian officers, like Major General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards who is an adviser to Khamenei, have said that Lebanon and Syria gave Iran “strategic depth.”4 Now it appears that Tehran is taking this a step further, preparing for a “Plan B” in the event Assad falls.

Nasrallah rarely makes such trips. The last time he went on a visit outside Lebanon was in February 2010 when he met in Damascus with Syrian President Bashar Assad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Nasrallah has taken great care not to appear in public since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and even more so since the assassination of the head of Hizbullah’s military wing, Imad Mughniyeh, in Damascus in February 2008. Even in Iran itself Nasrallah maintained total secrecy for fear of becoming an assassination target there. After the visit, he gave a speech in Lebanon on April 30, but did not say anything about his visit to Iran. He did remark that Syria “has real friends” that wouldn’t let it fall, implying that, if necessary, he would redouble his efforts to defend Iranian interests, which has always been one of the missions of Hizbullah.

It appears that Hizbullah’s ongoing involvement in Syria, and the extent of this involvement, formed the main issue on the agenda during Nasrallah’s visit to Tehran. The more time passes, the more Iran appears to regard Syria as a lynchpin of its Middle Eastern policy, in general, and of leading the jihad and the Islamic resistance to Israel, in particular. Hizbullah’s inclusion in the armed struggle in Syria is intended first and foremost to serve the Iranian strategy, which has been setting new goals apart from military assistance to the Syrian regime. Iran already seems to be looking beyond the regime’s survivability and preparing for a reality where it will have to operate in Syria even if Assad falls. Even before recent events in Syria, observers in the Arab world have been warning for years about growing evidence of “Iranian expansionism.”5

An important expression of Syria’s centrality in Iranian strategy was voiced by Mehdi Taaib, who heads Khamenei’s think tank. He recently stated that “Syria is the 35th district of Iran and it has greater strategic importance for Iran than Khuzestan [an Arab-populated district inside Iran]. By preserving Syria we will be able to get back Khuzestan, but if we lose Syria we will not even be able to keep Tehran.”6 Significantly, Taaib was drawing a comparison between Syria and a district that is under full Iranian sovereignty. What was also clear from his remarks was that Iran cannot afford to lose Syria.

Syria as a Shiite State
All in all, then, Iran will have to step up its military involvement in Syria. Khamenei’s representative in Lebanon will have to take part in building the new strategy in Syria, acting in tandem with Iran against the Sunni Islamic groups that threaten Iran’s interests in Syria.

Tehran has had political ambitions with respect to Syria for years and has indeed invested huge resources in making Syria a Shiite state. The process began during the rule of Hafez Assad when a far-reaching network was created of educational, cultural, and religious institutions throughout Syria; it was further expanded during Bashar’s reign. The aim was to promote the Shiization of all regions of the Syrian state. The Syrian regime let Iranian missionaries work freely to strengthen the Shiite faith in Damascus and the cities of the Alawite coast, as well as the smaller towns and villages.7 A field study by the European Union in the first half of 2006 found that the largest percentage of religious conversions to Shiism occurred in areas with an Alawite majority.8

In both urban and rural parts of Syria, Sunnis and others who adopted the Shiite faith received privileges and preferential treatment in the disbursement of Iranian aid money. The heads of the tribes in the Raqqa area were invited by the Iranian ambassador in Damascus to visit Iran cost-free, and the Iranians doled out funds to the poor and financial loans to merchants who were never required to pay them back..9 The dimensions of the Iranian investment in Raqqa, which included elegant public buildings, mosques, and Husayniyys (a Shiite religious institute), were recently revealed by Sunni rebels who took over the remote town and destroyed, plundered, and removed all signs of the Iranian and Shiite presence there.10

As of 2009 there were over 500 Husayniyys in Syria undergoing Iranian renovation work. In Damascus itself the Iranians invested huge sums to control the Shiite holy places including the tomb of Sayyida Zaynab, the shrine of Sayyida Ruqayya, and the shrine of Sayyida Sukayna. These sites attract Iranian tourism, which grew from 27,000 visitors in 1978 to 200,000 in 2003.

Iran also operates a cultural center in Damascus that it considers one of its most important and successful. This center publishes works in Arabic, holds biweekly cultural events, and conducts seminars and conferences aimed at enhancing the Iranian cultural influence in the country. The Iranian cultural center is also responsible for the propagation and study of the Persian language in Syrian universities, including providing teachers of Persian.11

Iran’s Sponsorship of Shiite Forces in Syria
At present, bloody battles are being waged over the centers of Iranian influence in Syria, most of all the mausoleum of Sayyida Zaynab – sister of the Imam Husayn – who in 680 carried his severed head to Damascus after the massacre at Karbala. In Iranian historiography, the great victory over the Sunnis is marked in Damascus in the form of a Shiite renaissance in the capital of the hated Umayyad Empire. The Sunnis, however, are now threatening these Iranian achievements. Hizbullah has been recruited to the cause, with hundreds of its fighters coming to Syria from Lebanon. These fighters try to downplay their Hizbullah affiliation and instead identify themselves as the Abu El Fadl Alabbas Brigade, named after the half-brother of the Imam Husayn.

Iran is also recruiting Shiite forces in Iraq for the warfare in Syria. These are organized in a sister framework of Lebanese Hizbullah. Known as the League of the Righteous People and Kateeb Hizbullah, its mission is to defend the Shiite centers in Damascus.12 Hizbullah fighters are also operating in other areas, some of them beyond the Lebanese border in the Shiite villages in Syrian territory on the way to Homs, thereby creating a sort of territorial continuity for ongoing Alawite control under Iranian influence. This continuity is strategically important to Iran since it links Lebanon and Damascus to the Alawite coast.13 Iran aims to have a network of militias in place inside Syria to protect its vital interests, regardless of what happens to Assad.14

The war in Syria persists with no decisive outcome on the horizon. Hizbullah’s battle losses are growing. Subhi Tufayli, the first head of Hizbullah who was dismissed from its leadership by Iran at the start of the 1990s, has been one of the prominent critics of Hizbullah’s involvement in Syria. Tufayli claimed that 138 Hizbullah fighters had been killed there along with scores of wounded who were brought to hospitals in Lebanon.15 Ceremonies for burial of the dead are frequently held clandestinely, sometimes at night, so as to avoid anger and resentment. These casualties, however, did not disappear from sight, and the families have raised harsh questions about such unnecessary sacrifice that is not in the sacred framework of jihad against Israel, which is Hizbullah’s raison d’être.

Tufayli, for his part, asserted that Hizbullah fighters who are killed in battle in Syria “are not martyrs” and “will go to hell.” Syria, he remarked, “is not Karbala” and the Hizbullah men in Syria “are not fighters of the Imam [Husayn]. The oppressed and innocent Syrian people is Karbala and the members of the Syrian people are the children of Husayn and Zaynab.” Tufayli went on to say that he “lauds the fathers and mothers who prevent their children from going to Syria and says to them that God’s blessing is with them.” Tufayli further pointed out that, legally speaking, no fatwa has been issued that permits Hizbullah’s participation in the war in Syria. He said he had appealed to the supreme religious authority – the sources of emulation (Maraji Taqlid) in Najaf and in Lebanon – not to issue such a fatwa.16

In the Lebanese Shiite community, Tufayli is not alone in leveling severe criticism at Hizbullah’s role as an arm of Iran in Syria. Voices within Hizbullah itself are increasingly casting doubt on the wisdom of involving the movement on Bashar Assad’s side. Others refuse to go and fight in Syria, and there have already been desertions from Hizbullah’s ranks. So far, though, it does not appear that all this is deterring Hizbullah from persisting. At the end of the day, Hizbullah is not a Lebanese national movement but a creation of Iran and subject to its exclusive authority. Nasrallah was summoned to Tehran so as to encourage him and order him to continue as a faithful and obedient soldier of Velayt-e Faqih (literally: the Rule of the Jurisprudent, referring to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei).

It is likely that Tehran will make every effort to recruit additional Shiite elements from Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and even from Pakistan. For the Islamic Republic, this is a war of survival against a radical Sunni uprising that views Iran and the Shiites as infidels to be annihilated. This is the real war being waged today, and it is within Islam. From Iran’s standpoint, if the extreme Sunnis of the al-Qaeda persuasion are not defeated in Syria, they will assert themselves in Iraq and threaten to take over the Persian Gulf, posing a real danger to Iran’s regional hegemony. Khamenei does not intend to give in. Hizbullah’s readiness to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Iran against the radical Sunnis could shatter the delicate internal order upon which the Lebanese state is based and bring about a Hizbullah take-over of Lebanon in its entirety.

- See more at: http://jcpa.org/article/irans-plans-to-take-over-syria/#sthash.yKTsDW0i.dpuf

Notes
1. On the picture and its significance, see Ali al-Amin, Al-Balad, April 23, 2013, http://www.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=74383&cid=76.
2. “Chief of Iran’s Quds Force Claims Iraq, South Lebanon under His Control, Al Arabiya News, January 20, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/20/189447.html.
3. A-Shiraa, March 15, 2013.
4. Nevvine Abdel Monem Mossad, “Implication of Iran Accepting Military Role in Syria, Lebanon,” The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, October 7, 2012.
5. Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, “Iran and Its Expansionist Tendencies,” Arab News, February 6, 2013, http://www.arabnews.com/iran-and-its-expansionist-tendencies; “US Embassy Cables: Omani Official Wary of Iranian Expansionism,” The Guardian, November 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/165127.
6. Ali-al-Amin, Al-Balad, February 17, 2013.
7. On the Shiization of Syria, see Khalid Sindawi, “The Shiite Turn in Syria,” Hudson Institute, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 8, 82-127, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-shiite-turn-in-syria.
8. Ibid., 84.
9. Ibid., 89-90.
10. Martin Kramer, “The Shiite Crescent Eclipsed,” April 16, 2013, http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/2013/04/the-shiite-crescent-is-broken.
11. Nadia von Maltzahn, “The Case of Iranian Cultural Diplomacy in Syria,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 2 (2009): 33-50.
12. Rabbiah Jamal, “Iraq’s Kateeb Hezbollah announces involvement in Syria,” Now Lebanon, April 7, 2013.
13. See the excellent article by Hanin Ghadder, “Hezbollah sacrifices popularity for survival: In Syria, The Party of God is struggling for an un-divine victory,” Now Lebanon, April 10, 2013.
14. Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Iran and Hezbollah Build Militia Networks in Syria in Event that Assad Falls, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, February 10, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-10/world/37026054_1_syrian-government-forces-iran-and-hezbollah-president-bashar.
15. www.metransparent.com, April 25, 2013.
16. Subhi Tufayli, interview, Al Arabiya, February 26, 2013. - See more at: http://jcpa.org/article/irans-plans-to-take-over-syria/#sthash.yKTsDW0i.dpuf