Hear, hear! Excellent arguments and common sense ideas the United States could take to stop gun violence. - R.O.
Sunday, December 16, 2012
Tuesday, December 11, 2012
Obama recognises Syria opposition
Did Obama just implicitly declare war on Assad? - R.O.
Obama recognises Syria opposition
The US has formally recognised Syria's opposition rebel coalition as the "legitimate representative" of the Syrian people, says President Obama.
Speaking to ABC News in the US, Mr Obama said the coalition was now "inclusive enough, is reflective and representative enough".
He described the move - already made by the UK and the EU - as "a big step".
Activists say some 40,000 people have died in more than 18 months of battle against President Bashar al-Assad.
Mr Obama said the emerging coalition had earned the right to represent the Syrian people, but issued a note of caution as well.
"Obviously, with that recognition comes responsibilities," Mr Obama said.
"To make sure that they organise themselves effectively, that they are representative of all the parties, [and] that they commit themselves to a political transition that respects women's rights and minority rights."
Recognition does not mean the US will begin arming rebel groups, but officials told ABC that might be approved if it was thought to help achieve a political solution in Syria.
The Syrian conflict is the bloodiest and most bitterly fought of the Middle East and north African revolts that have become known as the Arab Spring.
The uprisings began two years ago with a revolt in Tunisia, and saw long-serving leaders in Egypt and Libya toppled from power.
BBC © 2012
Thursday, December 6, 2012
We Ignore Islamism at Our Own Peril
For any avid foreign affairs reader, the distinction between Islam and Islamism is critical to properly understanding the drama of the Middle East. Moreover a full appreciation of what it is that defines these concepts will facilitate a much broader understanding of the threat facing Western and Arab powers alike. As we watch the violence unfolding in Syria, and the protests rising in Egypt, read the following article and carefully assess the distinction. - R.O.
Headlines to watch:
- Egyptian President's Defiant, Confrontational Speech
- Syria loads chemical weapons into bombs; military awaits Assad's order
- Islamic Fighters in Northern Syria Not United
- Assad faces life or death choice
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Islamology 101: What's the difference between Islam and Islamism?
By: Clifford D. May - Dec. 6, 2012 - National Review Online
 |
| White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan |
Google “Islamist” and you’ll get more than 24 million hits. Google “jihadist” and you’ll get millions more. Yet I bet the average American could not tell you what it is that Islamists and jihadists believe. And those at the highest levels of the U.S. government refuse to do so.
Why? John Brennan, the top counterterrorism adviser in the White House, argues that it is “counterproductive” to describe America’s “enemy as ‘jihadists’ or ‘Islamists’ because jihad is a holy struggle, a legitimate tenet of Islam, meaning to purify oneself or one’s community, and there is nothing holy or legitimate or Islamic about murdering innocent men, women and children.” To describe terrorists using “religious terms,” he adds, would “play into the false perception” that the “murderers” waging unconventional war against the West are doing so in the name of a “holy cause.”
I get it. I understand why it would be useful to convince as many of the world’s more than a billion Muslims as possible that Americans are only attempting to defend themselves against “violent extremists.” By now, however, it should be obvious that this spin — one can hardly call it analysis — has spun out. The unpleasant fact is that there is an ideology called Islamism and, as Yale professor Charles Hill recently noted, it “has been on the rise for generations.”
So we need to understand it. We need to understand how Islamism has unfolded from Islam, and how it differs from traditional Islam as practiced in places as far-flung and diverse as Kuala Lumpur, Erbil, and Timbuktu. This is what Bassam Tibi attempts in his most recent book, published this year, Islamism and Islam. It has received nowhere near the attention it deserves.
A Koret Foundation Senior Fellow at Stanford University, Tibi describes himself as an “Arab-Muslim pro-democracy theorist and practitioner.” Raised in Damascus, he has “studied Islam and its civilization for four decades, working in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa.” His research has led him to this simple and stark conclusion: “Islamism is a totalitarian ideology.” And just as there cannot be “democratic totalitarianism,” so there cannot be “democratic Islamism.”
Brennan and other American and European officials are wrong, Tibi says, to fear that “fighting Islamism is tantamount to declaring all of Islam a violent enemy.” As for the Obama administration’s insistence that “the enemy is specifically, and only, al-Qaeda,” that, Tibi writes, “is far too reductive.”
Tibi also faults Noah Feldman, the young scholar who advised the Bush administration, and who insisted, despite abundant evidence to the contrary, that sharia, Islamic law, can be viewed as “Islamic constitutionalism.” Feldman failed to grasp the significance of the “Islamist claim to supremacy (siyadat al-Islam),” the conviction that Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists are inferior and that their inferiority should be reflected under the law and by government institutions.
Tibi makes this important distinction: All jihadists are Islamists, but not all Islamists are jihadists. In other words, not all Islamists are committed to violence, including terrorism, as the preferred means to achieve their goals. He asks: “Can we trust Islamists who forgo violence to participate in good faith within a pluralistic, democratic system?” He answers: “I believe we cannot.”
Chief among Islamist goals, Tibi writes, is al-hall al Islami, “the Islamic solution, a kind of magic answer for all of the problems — global and local, socio-economic or value-related — in the crisis-ridden world of Islam.” Islamists ignore the fact that such governance has been implemented, for example, in Iran for over more than 30 years, in Afghanistan under the Taliban, in Gaza under Hamas, and in Sudan. It has never delivered development, freedom, human rights, or democracy. As for Turkey, Tibi sees it as “not yet an Islamist state” but heading in that direction.
Tibi makes some arguments with which I’d quarrel. For example, he views Saudi religious/political doctrines as a “variety of Salafism (orthodox, traditional Islam) not Islamism.” I would counter that Salafism is a variant of Islamism, albeit one based not on the writings of Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, but on nostalgia for the glory days of the seventh century.
Nevertheless, the debate Tibi is attempting to initiate is necessary — and long overdue. During the Cold War there was a field of study known as Sovietology. It was taught in our most elite universities with strong U.S. government support.
Why isn’t Islamology — not Islamic theology, or “Muslim-Christian understanding,” or “Islamic thought” — a discipline today? For one, Tibi observes, because to “protect themselves against criticism, Islamists have invented the formula of ‘Islamophobia’ to defame their critics.” (How did Stalin not come up with Sovietophobia or Russophobia?) And of course if such slander fails to intimidate, there are other ways to shut people up: Tibi has “survived attempts on my life by jihadists.”
A second reason for the absence of Islamology: The U.S. government cannot back the study of an ideology it stubbornly insists does not exist. Finally, those who do fund anything to do with Islam on campus — for example, the Gulf petro-princes who have given tens of millions of dollars to Georgetown and Harvard — have a different agenda, one that does not include free and serious inquiry. We ignore what they are doing — and what Tibi is telling us — at great peril.
— Clifford D. May is president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security.
Why? John Brennan, the top counterterrorism adviser in the White House, argues that it is “counterproductive” to describe America’s “enemy as ‘jihadists’ or ‘Islamists’ because jihad is a holy struggle, a legitimate tenet of Islam, meaning to purify oneself or one’s community, and there is nothing holy or legitimate or Islamic about murdering innocent men, women and children.” To describe terrorists using “religious terms,” he adds, would “play into the false perception” that the “murderers” waging unconventional war against the West are doing so in the name of a “holy cause.”
I get it. I understand why it would be useful to convince as many of the world’s more than a billion Muslims as possible that Americans are only attempting to defend themselves against “violent extremists.” By now, however, it should be obvious that this spin — one can hardly call it analysis — has spun out. The unpleasant fact is that there is an ideology called Islamism and, as Yale professor Charles Hill recently noted, it “has been on the rise for generations.”
So we need to understand it. We need to understand how Islamism has unfolded from Islam, and how it differs from traditional Islam as practiced in places as far-flung and diverse as Kuala Lumpur, Erbil, and Timbuktu. This is what Bassam Tibi attempts in his most recent book, published this year, Islamism and Islam. It has received nowhere near the attention it deserves.
A Koret Foundation Senior Fellow at Stanford University, Tibi describes himself as an “Arab-Muslim pro-democracy theorist and practitioner.” Raised in Damascus, he has “studied Islam and its civilization for four decades, working in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa.” His research has led him to this simple and stark conclusion: “Islamism is a totalitarian ideology.” And just as there cannot be “democratic totalitarianism,” so there cannot be “democratic Islamism.”
Brennan and other American and European officials are wrong, Tibi says, to fear that “fighting Islamism is tantamount to declaring all of Islam a violent enemy.” As for the Obama administration’s insistence that “the enemy is specifically, and only, al-Qaeda,” that, Tibi writes, “is far too reductive.”
Tibi also faults Noah Feldman, the young scholar who advised the Bush administration, and who insisted, despite abundant evidence to the contrary, that sharia, Islamic law, can be viewed as “Islamic constitutionalism.” Feldman failed to grasp the significance of the “Islamist claim to supremacy (siyadat al-Islam),” the conviction that Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists are inferior and that their inferiority should be reflected under the law and by government institutions.
Tibi makes this important distinction: All jihadists are Islamists, but not all Islamists are jihadists. In other words, not all Islamists are committed to violence, including terrorism, as the preferred means to achieve their goals. He asks: “Can we trust Islamists who forgo violence to participate in good faith within a pluralistic, democratic system?” He answers: “I believe we cannot.”
Chief among Islamist goals, Tibi writes, is al-hall al Islami, “the Islamic solution, a kind of magic answer for all of the problems — global and local, socio-economic or value-related — in the crisis-ridden world of Islam.” Islamists ignore the fact that such governance has been implemented, for example, in Iran for over more than 30 years, in Afghanistan under the Taliban, in Gaza under Hamas, and in Sudan. It has never delivered development, freedom, human rights, or democracy. As for Turkey, Tibi sees it as “not yet an Islamist state” but heading in that direction.
Tibi makes some arguments with which I’d quarrel. For example, he views Saudi religious/political doctrines as a “variety of Salafism (orthodox, traditional Islam) not Islamism.” I would counter that Salafism is a variant of Islamism, albeit one based not on the writings of Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, but on nostalgia for the glory days of the seventh century.
Nevertheless, the debate Tibi is attempting to initiate is necessary — and long overdue. During the Cold War there was a field of study known as Sovietology. It was taught in our most elite universities with strong U.S. government support.
Why isn’t Islamology — not Islamic theology, or “Muslim-Christian understanding,” or “Islamic thought” — a discipline today? For one, Tibi observes, because to “protect themselves against criticism, Islamists have invented the formula of ‘Islamophobia’ to defame their critics.” (How did Stalin not come up with Sovietophobia or Russophobia?) And of course if such slander fails to intimidate, there are other ways to shut people up: Tibi has “survived attempts on my life by jihadists.”
A second reason for the absence of Islamology: The U.S. government cannot back the study of an ideology it stubbornly insists does not exist. Finally, those who do fund anything to do with Islam on campus — for example, the Gulf petro-princes who have given tens of millions of dollars to Georgetown and Harvard — have a different agenda, one that does not include free and serious inquiry. We ignore what they are doing — and what Tibi is telling us — at great peril.
— Clifford D. May is president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security.
Wednesday, December 5, 2012
U.S.-Iran War Deadline: March 2013?
It is often argued that the 2003 War in Iraq was a "war of choice". But in fact it was a war of last resort. As Micah Zenko puts it in the article below, "After 12 years of diplomacy, 17 U.N. Security Council resolutions, increasingly targeted economic sanctions, multiple international inspection efforts, no-fly zones over both northern and southern Iraq, the selective use of U.S. military force in 1998, and Saddam Hussein's rejection of a final opportunity to leave Iraq and avoid war, the United States and the international community were out of options."
Almost a full decade later, the United States has begun to shift its strategy with respect to Iran. As with Iraq in 2003, the United States and its allies recognize that negotiations with Iran cannot drag on ad infinitum. Zenko explains, "Last week... the United States made a significant shift in its strategy. This move, if it plays out, could finally result in the long-rumored and much-debated military attack on Iran's known nuclear sites. In a prepared statement to the agency's Board of Governors, Robert A. Wood, chargé d'affaires to the IAEA, said:
Iran cannot be allowed to indefinitely ignore its obligations by attempting to make negotiation of a structured approach on PMD [possible military dimensions] an endless process. Iran must act now, in substance.... If by March Iran has not begun substantive cooperation with the IAEA, the United States will work with other Board members to pursue appropriate Board action, and would urge the Board to consider reporting this lack of progress to the UN Security Council."
This is certainly a development to watch in the months ahead. The world cannot allow the fanatical Iranian authoritarian Islamic theocracy, driven by 7th Century eschatology, to obtain nuclear weapons. Zenko's article is below. - R.O.
Headlines to watch:
- Iranian nuclear bomb would trigger arms race: Iran ex-official
- USS Eisenhower aircraft carrier arrives off Syrian shore
- Israeli Intelligence Official: Border With Syria Will Soon be “the Hottest Border in Israel”
If you have followed the covert and diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon over the past five years, you know that new or noteworthy movements from Tehran, Tel Aviv, or Washington are few and far between. Iran makes fantastic claims about advances in its civilian nuclear program, many of which are subsequently confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Israel threatens to attack Iran in a thinly veiled effort to impel the P5+1 negotiating group (China, Russia, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) to increase economic and diplomatic sanctions; and American officials repeatedly pledge to prevent a nuclear Iran, while the U.S. military gradually strengthens its capabilities in theater and deepens its cooperation with Gulf states in order to contain Iran.
Underpinning this rhetorical bluster is the recognition that negotiations to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA -- to demonstrate that the Iranian civilian nuclear program does not have possible military dimensions, forbidden by the NPT Safeguards Agreement signed by Iran in 1974 -- are not sustainable. Experts predict that the nuclear dispute between the P5+1 (predominantly the United States) and Iran will ultimately be resolved -- either through negotiations or the use of force.Some (including yours truly) have speculated this resolution will come this year, or the following year, or the year after that. During a press conference on Thursday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak acknowledged this enduring forecasting problem: "I think that it will happen during 2013, but I thought that it will happen during 2012, and saw what happened -- and 2011."
Last week, however, the United States made a significant shift in its strategy. This move, if it plays out, could finally result in the long-rumored and much-debated military attack on Iran's known nuclear sites. In a prepared statement to the agency's Board of Governors, Robert A. Wood, chargé d'affaires to the IAEA, said:
Then, Clinton introduces a vague new goal for negotiations. Until now, Obama administration officials have repeated three claims about U.S. intelligence on Iran's nuclear program.
First, Iran has not decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. In February 2011, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified, "We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." But, he added, "We do not know...if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." The following February, Clapper stated, "We don't believe they've actually made the decision to go ahead with a nuclear weapon."
Second, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will make the final decision. As Clapper phrased it: "The decision would be made by the Supreme Leader himself, and he would base that on a cost-benefit analysis in terms of -- I don't think you want a nuclear weapon at any price."
Third, because Iran's nuclear program is an intelligence collection priority, U.S. officials would know when the Supreme Leader made this decision and what sort of evidence would reveal his intentions. Clapper: "[A] clear indicator would be enrichment of uranium to a 90 percent level." The declared nuclear sites where such enrichment occurs are subject to IAEA physical inventory verifications, which track progress in Iran's low-enriched uranium stockpiles and are published in quarterly reports.
Why did the Obama administration decide to set this new March deadline? Perhaps, like the Bush administration, it has simply become tired of confronting Iran. Here, the Bush administration's approach to Iraq is worth recalling. In a recent Foreign Policy piece reviewing U.S. policy options toward Iran, Steven Hadley, deputy national security adviser during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, wrote:
The confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program dates back to August 2002, when it was first revealed that Iran had begun a covert uranium-enrichment program in the late 1980s. Since then, the IAEA has repeatedly stated what its Director General Yukio Amano declared last week: "Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation to enable us to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
At some point in February or early March of 2013, there will be two significant events relating to a potential countdown to an attack on Iran. Clapper will testify before the House and Senate as part of his annual threat briefings, and the IAEA will release its next quarterly report. Unless there is new intelligence, it is likely that Clapper will maintain his assessment that the Supreme Leader has not made the decision to pursue a bomb -- meaning to enrich enough uranium to bomb-grade level that can be formed into sphere that could be compressed into a critical mass. Meanwhile, absent breakthrough in the P5+1 negotiations or a decision by Tehran that unprecedented transparency with the IAEA will make things better, Amano will again report that there is inadequate cooperation.
In that case, the IAEA Board of Governors could refer Iran to the UN Security Council, which might pass a more robust version of Resolution 1929, which imposed sanctions. But then what? If the Supreme Leader does not make a decision to pursue a bomb (which the United States claims it would detect), and if Iran does not produce sufficient highly-enriched uranium for a bomb at a declared site (which the IAEA would detect), then what would trigger an attack by the United States and/or Israel? What would the "redline" be?
The answer depends greatly on whether the timeline to attack Iran is based on Israel's national interest and its military capabilities, or those of the United States. Israeli officials have stated at various times that redlines should be "clear" (without providing clarity) and that they "should be made, but not publicly." One also said, "I don't want to set redlines or deadlines for myself." Since November 2011, Israeli officials have also warned about a "zone of immunity," which Barak has described as "not where the Iranians decide to break out of the non-proliferation treaty and move toward a nuclear device or weapon, but at the place where the dispersal, protection and survivability efforts will cross a point that would make a physical strike impractical."
It is unclear how dispersed, protected, or survivable Iran's nuclear program would have to be, but Secretary Clinton's warning of "components...on a shelf somewhere" could indicate that the Obama administration is moving toward the zone of immunity logic. But what are these components, how many would be required to assume "weaponization," and how would this new intelligence be presented as a justification for war? In addition, it is tough to make the case for going to war with Iran because it refused to concentrate its nuclear sites (that are under IAEA safeguards) in above-ground facilities that can be easily bombed.
Previously, U.S. officials have been less eager than the Israelis to define a specific redline, largely because the two countries have different perceptions of the Iranian threat and vastly different military capabilities. Setting a March deadline provides some certainty and perhaps coercive leverage to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. But declaring deadlines also places U.S. "credibility" on the line, generating momentum to use force even if there is no new actionable intelligence that Iran has decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. Based on what we know right now, that would be a strategic miscalculation.
- Israeli Intelligence Official: Border With Syria Will Soon be “the Hottest Border in Israel”
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Countdown: Did the U.S. just set a March deadline for war with Iran?
By: Micah Zenko - December 4, 2012 - Foreign Policy.com
 |
| Robert A. Wood, chargé d'affaires to the IAEA. Credit: Foreign Policy.com |
If you have followed the covert and diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon over the past five years, you know that new or noteworthy movements from Tehran, Tel Aviv, or Washington are few and far between. Iran makes fantastic claims about advances in its civilian nuclear program, many of which are subsequently confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Israel threatens to attack Iran in a thinly veiled effort to impel the P5+1 negotiating group (China, Russia, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) to increase economic and diplomatic sanctions; and American officials repeatedly pledge to prevent a nuclear Iran, while the U.S. military gradually strengthens its capabilities in theater and deepens its cooperation with Gulf states in order to contain Iran.
Underpinning this rhetorical bluster is the recognition that negotiations to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA -- to demonstrate that the Iranian civilian nuclear program does not have possible military dimensions, forbidden by the NPT Safeguards Agreement signed by Iran in 1974 -- are not sustainable. Experts predict that the nuclear dispute between the P5+1 (predominantly the United States) and Iran will ultimately be resolved -- either through negotiations or the use of force.Some (including yours truly) have speculated this resolution will come this year, or the following year, or the year after that. During a press conference on Thursday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak acknowledged this enduring forecasting problem: "I think that it will happen during 2013, but I thought that it will happen during 2012, and saw what happened -- and 2011."
Last week, however, the United States made a significant shift in its strategy. This move, if it plays out, could finally result in the long-rumored and much-debated military attack on Iran's known nuclear sites. In a prepared statement to the agency's Board of Governors, Robert A. Wood, chargé d'affaires to the IAEA, said:
Iran cannot be allowed to indefinitely ignore its obligations by attempting to make negotiation of a structured approach on PMD [possible military dimensions] an endless process. Iran must act now, in substance.... If by March Iran has not begun substantive cooperation with the IAEA, the United States will work with other Board members to pursue appropriate Board action, and would urge the Board to consider reporting this lack of progress to the UN Security Council.Later that day, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was asked about Wood's mention of a March deadline. Her reply contained several interesting points:
What was meant about the March reference was either about the IAEA and its continuing work or the fact that we finished our election and now would be a good time to test the proposition that there can be some good-faith serious negotiations before the Iranians get into their elections, which are going to heat up probably around the March period, heading toward a June election.
It's a difficult matter to predict, because it really depends upon how serious the Iranians are about making a decision that removes the possibility of their being able to acquire a nuclear weapon or the components of one that can be in effect on a shelf somewhere and still serve as a basis for intimidation...We'll see in the next few months whether there's a chance for any kind of a serious negotiation.Here, Clinton implies that the reason to "test" Iran now is not because of progress toward alleged weaponization, but because there is a window for negotiations, after the U.S. election and before the Iranian election. It is interesting that the Obama administration deemed it wrong to "test" Iran during the heat of the U.S. presidential elections but thinks it plausible that, during similar electoral uncertainty, Iranian leaders will reach a broad strategic agreement limiting the country's uranium-enrichment program.
Then, Clinton introduces a vague new goal for negotiations. Until now, Obama administration officials have repeated three claims about U.S. intelligence on Iran's nuclear program.
First, Iran has not decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. In February 2011, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified, "We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." But, he added, "We do not know...if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." The following February, Clapper stated, "We don't believe they've actually made the decision to go ahead with a nuclear weapon."
Second, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will make the final decision. As Clapper phrased it: "The decision would be made by the Supreme Leader himself, and he would base that on a cost-benefit analysis in terms of -- I don't think you want a nuclear weapon at any price."
Third, because Iran's nuclear program is an intelligence collection priority, U.S. officials would know when the Supreme Leader made this decision and what sort of evidence would reveal his intentions. Clapper: "[A] clear indicator would be enrichment of uranium to a 90 percent level." The declared nuclear sites where such enrichment occurs are subject to IAEA physical inventory verifications, which track progress in Iran's low-enriched uranium stockpiles and are published in quarterly reports.
Why did the Obama administration decide to set this new March deadline? Perhaps, like the Bush administration, it has simply become tired of confronting Iran. Here, the Bush administration's approach to Iraq is worth recalling. In a recent Foreign Policy piece reviewing U.S. policy options toward Iran, Steven Hadley, deputy national security adviser during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, wrote:
The U.S. military action [in Iraq] was not, as many suggest, either a war of choice or a war of preemption. It was, rather, a war of last resort. After 12 years of diplomacy, 17 U.N. Security Council resolutions, increasingly targeted economic sanctions, multiple international inspection efforts, no-fly zones over both northern and southern Iraq, the selective use of U.S. military force in 1998, and Saddam Hussein's rejection of a final opportunity to leave Iraq and avoid war, the United States and the international community were out of options.It is difficult to understand why the Bush administration decided to abandon a successful containment strategy of Iraq that cost $14.5 billion a year and no loss of life, for another that will ultimately cost over $3 trillion and the lives of 4,422 U.S. troops. Undertaking a war of choice without definitive evidence of an active chemical or biological weapons program -- let alone a nuclear program -- or threats to the U.S. homeland was an enormous strategic miscalculation with dire consequences.
The confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program dates back to August 2002, when it was first revealed that Iran had begun a covert uranium-enrichment program in the late 1980s. Since then, the IAEA has repeatedly stated what its Director General Yukio Amano declared last week: "Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation to enable us to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."
At some point in February or early March of 2013, there will be two significant events relating to a potential countdown to an attack on Iran. Clapper will testify before the House and Senate as part of his annual threat briefings, and the IAEA will release its next quarterly report. Unless there is new intelligence, it is likely that Clapper will maintain his assessment that the Supreme Leader has not made the decision to pursue a bomb -- meaning to enrich enough uranium to bomb-grade level that can be formed into sphere that could be compressed into a critical mass. Meanwhile, absent breakthrough in the P5+1 negotiations or a decision by Tehran that unprecedented transparency with the IAEA will make things better, Amano will again report that there is inadequate cooperation.
In that case, the IAEA Board of Governors could refer Iran to the UN Security Council, which might pass a more robust version of Resolution 1929, which imposed sanctions. But then what? If the Supreme Leader does not make a decision to pursue a bomb (which the United States claims it would detect), and if Iran does not produce sufficient highly-enriched uranium for a bomb at a declared site (which the IAEA would detect), then what would trigger an attack by the United States and/or Israel? What would the "redline" be?
The answer depends greatly on whether the timeline to attack Iran is based on Israel's national interest and its military capabilities, or those of the United States. Israeli officials have stated at various times that redlines should be "clear" (without providing clarity) and that they "should be made, but not publicly." One also said, "I don't want to set redlines or deadlines for myself." Since November 2011, Israeli officials have also warned about a "zone of immunity," which Barak has described as "not where the Iranians decide to break out of the non-proliferation treaty and move toward a nuclear device or weapon, but at the place where the dispersal, protection and survivability efforts will cross a point that would make a physical strike impractical."
It is unclear how dispersed, protected, or survivable Iran's nuclear program would have to be, but Secretary Clinton's warning of "components...on a shelf somewhere" could indicate that the Obama administration is moving toward the zone of immunity logic. But what are these components, how many would be required to assume "weaponization," and how would this new intelligence be presented as a justification for war? In addition, it is tough to make the case for going to war with Iran because it refused to concentrate its nuclear sites (that are under IAEA safeguards) in above-ground facilities that can be easily bombed.
Previously, U.S. officials have been less eager than the Israelis to define a specific redline, largely because the two countries have different perceptions of the Iranian threat and vastly different military capabilities. Setting a March deadline provides some certainty and perhaps coercive leverage to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. But declaring deadlines also places U.S. "credibility" on the line, generating momentum to use force even if there is no new actionable intelligence that Iran has decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. Based on what we know right now, that would be a strategic miscalculation.
By: Micah Zenko
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
Israel's irrationality is our fault
The article below is absolutely one of the best I've read all year about Israel's situation in the world today. A highly worthy read. - R.O.
Headlines to watch:
- NATO approves Turkey missile-defence system
Headlines to watch:
- NATO approves Turkey missile-defence system
- NATO warns Syria not to use chemical weapons
- Jerusalem rejects UN call to open nuke program to probe
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Israel's irrationality is our fault - The Commentator
Israel's actions in expanding settlements is a direct result of being maligned and bullied by the international community, writes Executive Editor Raheem Kassam
Britain has a major problem and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is clearly tied up in knots about it.
On the one hand, you have a strong and legitimate will to solve the issue of Palestinian statehood. The problem isn't going away and last week's UN General Assembly vote cemented the fact that the international community wants, sooner rather than later, the Palestinian state to come into its own.
But in doing this in such a manner, decades of negotiations have effectively been defenestrated.
Many have argued that this is a good thing. After all, where have decades of negotiations led? Frankly, nowhere.
But it's naive and dishonest to argue that there are not rejectionists and appeasers in this scenario. That there has been equal will from both sides is a misnomer that is being propagated by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Calling Mahmoud Abbas, a man who presides over incitement, glorification of terrorism and deals with terrorists, a "courageous man of peace" is to move the goalposts distinctly away from Israel's favour.
The reality is that Israel's favour must come foremost in the equation. Before we hear the arguments why not, as we are sure there will be plenty in the comments section, let's consider why.
Israel remains the most legitimate, functioning, transparent and safe democracy in the region. There is little chance, as the considerations are made of its newly democratic neighbours, of Israel turning its back on this form of government that lends to enshrined freedoms not just for Jews, but for the many Christians, Muslims, Druze and Baha'i that live within Israel's borders.
This is also true for women. It is true for homosexuals. It is true for young and old, for rich and poor - Israel is a model for the region. If anyone can doubt this, they are free to name another, but a list of Israel's neighbours does nothing to detract from this statement. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia Yemen, Syria, UAE, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.
None of these countries ranks as highly for core tests on matters of liberty as Israel does.
But granted, this is not the be all and end all of why Western allies should treat Israel differently, though it does form an important and undeniable foundation.
Israel, though not perfect, has gone to great lengths to protect both its own citizens and the Palestinian people at the very same time. The knives come out very quickly against Israel, usually in the form of phrases like 'apartheid wall' and 'prison camp' - but remind yourselves that only five percent of Israel's security fence is a 'wall', and that terror attacks from the West Bank have decreased by more than 90 percent. Unless you're on the side that actively wishes for Israeli civilians to be killed (and sadly there are many) - doesn't this statistic prove that it was a legitimate endeavour at a time when the Palestinian leadership showed no interest in furthering peace negotiations?
In Gaza, does Israel act as an 'oppressor' in limiting and searching goods that it actually helps filter through, or does it protect both the Gazan people from a terrorist outfit who created a de facto dictatorship in the area, and itself from further attacks across the border? All the while, Israel has increased the amount of traffic in goods to Gaza and reciprocally, many Gazans make the daily commute into Israel to do business. Despite what the anti-Israel lobby would have you think, I myself spoke to Palestinian businessmen in June this year who indicated their will to work with and inside Israel, if only Hamas would disappear.
Consider again what great lengths Israel goes to in an attempt to limit civilian causalities in its ongoing conflict with Hamas. Does Israel place Hamas rocket sites metres away from schools? No, Hamas does. Does Israel target civilians? No, Hamas does.
And when the international community called upon Israel to withdraw from its occupation of Gaza, to allow 'democracy to flourish' - pray tell what happened? The unilateral disengagement in 2005 led to a terrorist organisation not simply taking the reins of government, but brutally smashing the opposition (the Palestinian Authority) and proceeding to fire well over 8,000 rockets into Israel as a result. Hamas has turned Gaza into a weapons storage and launch facility for Iran - nothing more, nothing less.
And yet Israel is now also expected to lend diplomatic legitimacy in that direction - as we saw with Egypt's negotiation of a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel just weeks ago.
The facts you'd think would speak for themselves - but while Israel is not guilt-free, she has been consistently rational and more often than not, responsible towards not only her own people, but towards Palestinians also.
Now the international community, Britain at the fore, is pushing Israel beyond the scope of what is reasonable.
The failure to get the Palestinians around the negotiating table prior to a UN statehood bid is a blow to Israel's continued efforts to renew talks. A settlement moratorium was ignored by the Palestinians, as has been every offer to sit down with no preconditions, an offer made as recently as October 2012 by Prime Minister Netanyahu.
So Israel has finally responded in a manner that befits David, rather than the Goliath it is made out to be. As the only Jewish state, the only legitimate and transparent and free democracy in the region, Israel has been pushed to taking an offensive stance rather than a defensive stance.
This relates to the announcement of 3,000 new settler units and plans to develop the E1 area east of Jerusalem - a position that may well cut the Palestinian areas off from the West Bank.
Is this the fault of some super right-wing expansionist plot? Not likely. It will cost Israel time, money, political and diplomatic capital and is the equivalent not just to kicking the can down the road, but to booting it over the fence and into a pond.
When actions have been taken repeatedly to undermine the position of an ally whose actions are broadly reflective of a strong will for peace - then certain rational and responsible actions go out the window with it.
Expanding and building settlements in areas that could and would be Palestinian areas is of course irrational and irresponsible, but the international community, Britain especially, has placed Israel in a position whereby it sees, from the world's feelings and dealings on Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, that aggression seems to be consistently rewarded.
In now talking about 'tough sanctions' against Israel for its actions, Britain espouses yet another inconsistent response to bringing parties in the region to the table - and has landed itself a position of increasing irrelevance and opposition to its allies in Israel and the United States.
For Britain, Israel's actions are unpalatable. For Israel, Britain's reaction is unconscionable.
Raheem Kassam is the Executive Editor for The Commentator
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Israel's irrationality is our fault - The Commentator
Israel's actions in expanding settlements is a direct result of being maligned and bullied by the international community, writes Executive Editor Raheem Kassam
Britain has a major problem and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is clearly tied up in knots about it.
On the one hand, you have a strong and legitimate will to solve the issue of Palestinian statehood. The problem isn't going away and last week's UN General Assembly vote cemented the fact that the international community wants, sooner rather than later, the Palestinian state to come into its own.
But in doing this in such a manner, decades of negotiations have effectively been defenestrated.
Many have argued that this is a good thing. After all, where have decades of negotiations led? Frankly, nowhere.
But it's naive and dishonest to argue that there are not rejectionists and appeasers in this scenario. That there has been equal will from both sides is a misnomer that is being propagated by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Calling Mahmoud Abbas, a man who presides over incitement, glorification of terrorism and deals with terrorists, a "courageous man of peace" is to move the goalposts distinctly away from Israel's favour.
The reality is that Israel's favour must come foremost in the equation. Before we hear the arguments why not, as we are sure there will be plenty in the comments section, let's consider why.
Israel remains the most legitimate, functioning, transparent and safe democracy in the region. There is little chance, as the considerations are made of its newly democratic neighbours, of Israel turning its back on this form of government that lends to enshrined freedoms not just for Jews, but for the many Christians, Muslims, Druze and Baha'i that live within Israel's borders.
This is also true for women. It is true for homosexuals. It is true for young and old, for rich and poor - Israel is a model for the region. If anyone can doubt this, they are free to name another, but a list of Israel's neighbours does nothing to detract from this statement. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia Yemen, Syria, UAE, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.
None of these countries ranks as highly for core tests on matters of liberty as Israel does.
But granted, this is not the be all and end all of why Western allies should treat Israel differently, though it does form an important and undeniable foundation.
Israel, though not perfect, has gone to great lengths to protect both its own citizens and the Palestinian people at the very same time. The knives come out very quickly against Israel, usually in the form of phrases like 'apartheid wall' and 'prison camp' - but remind yourselves that only five percent of Israel's security fence is a 'wall', and that terror attacks from the West Bank have decreased by more than 90 percent. Unless you're on the side that actively wishes for Israeli civilians to be killed (and sadly there are many) - doesn't this statistic prove that it was a legitimate endeavour at a time when the Palestinian leadership showed no interest in furthering peace negotiations?
In Gaza, does Israel act as an 'oppressor' in limiting and searching goods that it actually helps filter through, or does it protect both the Gazan people from a terrorist outfit who created a de facto dictatorship in the area, and itself from further attacks across the border? All the while, Israel has increased the amount of traffic in goods to Gaza and reciprocally, many Gazans make the daily commute into Israel to do business. Despite what the anti-Israel lobby would have you think, I myself spoke to Palestinian businessmen in June this year who indicated their will to work with and inside Israel, if only Hamas would disappear.
Consider again what great lengths Israel goes to in an attempt to limit civilian causalities in its ongoing conflict with Hamas. Does Israel place Hamas rocket sites metres away from schools? No, Hamas does. Does Israel target civilians? No, Hamas does.
And when the international community called upon Israel to withdraw from its occupation of Gaza, to allow 'democracy to flourish' - pray tell what happened? The unilateral disengagement in 2005 led to a terrorist organisation not simply taking the reins of government, but brutally smashing the opposition (the Palestinian Authority) and proceeding to fire well over 8,000 rockets into Israel as a result. Hamas has turned Gaza into a weapons storage and launch facility for Iran - nothing more, nothing less.
And yet Israel is now also expected to lend diplomatic legitimacy in that direction - as we saw with Egypt's negotiation of a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel just weeks ago.
The facts you'd think would speak for themselves - but while Israel is not guilt-free, she has been consistently rational and more often than not, responsible towards not only her own people, but towards Palestinians also.
Now the international community, Britain at the fore, is pushing Israel beyond the scope of what is reasonable.
The failure to get the Palestinians around the negotiating table prior to a UN statehood bid is a blow to Israel's continued efforts to renew talks. A settlement moratorium was ignored by the Palestinians, as has been every offer to sit down with no preconditions, an offer made as recently as October 2012 by Prime Minister Netanyahu.
So Israel has finally responded in a manner that befits David, rather than the Goliath it is made out to be. As the only Jewish state, the only legitimate and transparent and free democracy in the region, Israel has been pushed to taking an offensive stance rather than a defensive stance.
This relates to the announcement of 3,000 new settler units and plans to develop the E1 area east of Jerusalem - a position that may well cut the Palestinian areas off from the West Bank.
Is this the fault of some super right-wing expansionist plot? Not likely. It will cost Israel time, money, political and diplomatic capital and is the equivalent not just to kicking the can down the road, but to booting it over the fence and into a pond.
When actions have been taken repeatedly to undermine the position of an ally whose actions are broadly reflective of a strong will for peace - then certain rational and responsible actions go out the window with it.
Expanding and building settlements in areas that could and would be Palestinian areas is of course irrational and irresponsible, but the international community, Britain especially, has placed Israel in a position whereby it sees, from the world's feelings and dealings on Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, that aggression seems to be consistently rewarded.
In now talking about 'tough sanctions' against Israel for its actions, Britain espouses yet another inconsistent response to bringing parties in the region to the table - and has landed itself a position of increasing irrelevance and opposition to its allies in Israel and the United States.
For Britain, Israel's actions are unpalatable. For Israel, Britain's reaction is unconscionable.
Raheem Kassam is the Executive Editor for The Commentator
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